Aircraft Accident Investigation Report

52 The Flight Safety Division’s safety oversight of this ATO was not very effective in that it failed to detect the lack of full complement of key management personnel and the deficiencies in its procedures; also it failed to have the ATO correct the deficiencies that it identified in a timely and satisfactory manner. Flight Safety Inspectors were assigned tasks for which they had not received the required regulatory training and qualifications. 2.5 Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority Air Traffic Services Although there were some deficiencies of ATS’s operations, there were no air traffic control factors that contributed to the cause of the accident. 2.6 Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority Aircraft Accident Investigation The JCAA’ s failure to have in place a formal arrangement for the provision of security at an aircraft accident site, or formal arrangements for the movement and secure storage of aircraft wreckage can adversely impact the outcome of an aircraft accident investigation process as the aircraft wreckage could be tampered with or crucial components could be removed or disturbed. 2.7 Caribbean Aviation Training Center The ATO’s lack of the full complement of key management personnel who were qualified and competent, particularly with regard to the Chief Flight Instructor & Assistant Chief Flight Instructor adversely affected the ATO’s ability to ensure continuity of supervision of its flight operations. The ATO’s lack of quality assurance procedures and a Quality Assurance Manager impaired the ATO’s ability to monitor compliance with and adequacy of its procedures required to ensure safe operational practices and airworthy aircraft. The vacancy of the Maintenance Coordinator position impaired the ATO’s ability to ensure timely and satisfactory completion of all aircraft maintenance related activity and compliance with the airworthiness requirements of its aircraft. The decision by the ATO to conduct maintenance on its own aircraft was contrary to the policies and procedures set out in its Air Training Organization Manual., further, the ATO did not have a Director of Maintenance or a Chief Inspector at the time of the accident. The absence of Maintenance Director adversely affected the ATO’s ability to ensure the satisfactory and timely completion of aircraft maintenance functions required in accordance with the ATO’s Maintenance Program for its aircraft. The absence of the Chief Inspector adversely affected the ATO’s ability to monitor that its activities were being performed in accordance with the maintenance requirements and accepted procedures.