Aircraft Accident Investigation Report

55 10. The defect reporting procedures set out in CATC’s Air Training Organization Manual contradicted those found in their Maintenance Control Manual. 11. A number of the procedures in the Air Training Organization Manual were not being adhered to by CATC’s employees and its students. 12. A number of procedures in the Maintenance Control Manual were not being adhered to by CATC’s employees. 13. Prior to take off a UAV was observed to be operating in the vicinity of the hangar used by CATC at Tinson Pen Aerodrome. 14. There were no specific operating regulations in the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2012, governing the operation of UAV’s at the time of the accident. 15. Some of the JCAA Technical Personnel who were assigned to do surveillance tasks on the ATO were not properly trained and qualified prior to their assignment. 16. The Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority had no written guidance procedures for use by its Inspectors in the certification of Approved Training Organizations and Air Navigation Service Providers at the time of the accident. 17. The JCAA Audit Procedures Manual was not in conformance to the Civil Aviation Regulations of Jamaica. 18. The Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority’s safety oversight of the ATO’s procedures and operations was inadequate. 19. There was no documentation seen in the Flight Safety Department files to demonstrate that this Approved Training Organization was recertified in accordance with Regulation 90 of the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2004, and Transition Procedure Guidelines, dated December 8, 2004. 20. The Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority’s monitoring system had been ineffective in identifying and making the operator correct the procedural lapses. 21. There was no certificated Automatic Weather Observation System (AWOS) at the ATS Tower as required by the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2012, the Twenty Fourth “A” Schedule, Paragraph 24.079 (b) (5) (viii) and the Letter of Agreement between the Air Traffic Services and the Meteorological Service. 22. There was no audible alarm at the ATS tower to alert emergency services as required by Civil Aviation Regulations, 2012, the Twenty Fourth “A” Schedule, Paragraph 24.079 (b) (5) (xv). 23. There was no voice recording equipment at the ATS Tower as required by Civil Aviation Regulations, 2012, the Twenty Fourth “A” Schedule, Paragraph 24.079 (b) (5) (xiii). 24. The Air Navigation Service Provider has not completed certification as required by the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2012, the Twenty Fourth “A” Schedule, Subpart C. 25. The Air Traffic Services Manual of Operations (MANOPS) 3 rd Edition Errata Version 2012 had not been approved by the Flight Safety Division of JCAA as required by the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2012, the Twenty Fourth “A” Schedule. 26. There was no Unit Specific ATS Manual as required by the Civil Aviation Regulations, 2012, the Twenty Fourth “A” Schedule, Paragraph 24.045. 27. There was no security in place at the accident site after fire was extinguished and the bodies were recovered from the aircraft.