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6.50.
The barricades and embattlements, the early warning
system and the presence of a large number of gunmen together
provided a formidable defence mechanism that presented serious risks
to residents and the security forces alike.
6.51.
The heavy gunfire aimed at the security forces had some
negative effects on the operation. It slowed the movement of the
security forces and delayed their entry into Tivoli Gardens. We accept
that it took approximately 30 minutes for the soldiers under the
command of Lt. Col. Sewell to make their way north along Industrial
Terrace to its intersection with McKenzie Drive. Such a journey would
normally take 5 minutes. As a result of the intensity of the gunfire, the
unit led by Lt. Col. Sewell entered sector 1 inside Tivoli Gardens about
noon, having left the UDC car park at 11.30 a.m.
6.52.
We accept as credible the evidence of CoP Ellington and
other senior police officers that the barricades and embattlements
were of a quality and quantity that precluded their safe removal by the
JCF. Indeed, on 23 May, owing to the blockading of roads and shooting
by gunmen, a police rescue operation led by ACP Rose had to be
aborted. As a result, they were at first, unable to rescue colleagues at
the Darling Street Police Station.
6.53.
We also find that the sustained and coordinated violent
efforts of the gunmen so restricted the progress of the security forces
that the process of pacification of the designated sectors within Tivoli
Gardens was significantly delayed. It was not until about 3.00 p.m.
that sectors 1 and 2 were dominated while sector 3 was not controlled
until approximately 5.00 p.m. although the JCF did not enter this sector
until daybreak on 25 May. In our opinion, the time taken to dominate