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evidence untrustworthy. We accept Maj. Kennedy’s evidence that he
secured the sector about 4.35 p.m., “called the JCF (i.e. DSP Turner)
and they came”. We do not believe that Supt. Turner went into the
sector almost 4 hours later at 8.20 p.m. after being called by
Maj. Kennedy at 8.05 p.m. All the sectors had been pacified by
6.00 p.m. at the latest. What was DSP Turner doing for another
2½ hours? He never communicated with Maj. Kennedy that he was in
any difficulty such as would have prevented him from entering the
sector.
10.62.
Moreover, we find that checkpoints were established in and
around the sector about 5.00
p.m.Itdoes not accord with
commonsense or the exercise of power given to the police under the
Emergency Powers Regulations that check points should not have been
established as soon as the sector was under control. DSP Turner tried
to make us believe that, for the whole of the evening of 24 May, he
took no steps to establish check points in sector 2. The production of a
page from DSP Turner’s notebook only served to cast further doubt on
his credibility. The date of the entry “8.20 p.m.” is shown as 23 May
2010. The date of the operation was 24 May 2010. We also find it hard
to accept the evidence of DSP Turner referred to at para.10.41. We are
forced to ask the question: Why would Maj. Kennedy report seeing two
dead bodies in buildings on McKenzie Drive when, according to DSP
Turner, his men went to the locations and saw no bodies?
Sgt. Waugh
10.63.
The manner in which dead bodies were collected and
transported to KPH does not reflect well on Sgt. Waugh and Sgt. Pratt.
According to them, they drove around randomly on 25 May. Neither
knew where the other was. Both claimed ignorance of the roads in