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disquiet which had been festering since August 2009; the history of
violent confrontations between the people of Tivoli Gardens and the
security forces, he ought to have foreseen the probability of violent
confrontation. In those circumstances, we think that it was incumbent
upon him as Prime Minister and Minister responsible for Defence to
have communicated with the Heads of the security forces prior to his
broadcast. But we make no adverse finding against Mr. Golding with
regard to this matter since he readily acknowledged that there may
have been merit in opinions that his announcement deprived the
security forces of the element of surprise. In any event, this was a
matter of judgement for Mr. Golding.
3.57.
The manner in which the Tivoli Gardens community was
barricaded, its extensive nature and the speed of erection of the
barricades portrayed a frightening situation and experience for both
the residents and the security forces. We believe that such fortification
of a residential community in a Commonwealth Caribbean State was
unprecedented in the history of the region.
3.58.
We accept the evidence that, gunmen from Tivoli Gardens
and approximately 300 gunmen from across Jamaica, were mobilised
with a view to preventing the arrest of Coke. In Chapter 7, we report
that, as early as 19 May when he visited Coke in Tivoli Gardens,
Bishop Herro Blair saw in excess of 50 armed men in the community.
It is clear to us, especially on the basis of the film and photographic
evidence tendered, that the Intelligence units of the JCF and JDF were
receiving credible evidence of the preparations by persons determined
to prevent Coke’s arrest.
3.59.
We, however, are troubled that the vast majority of
residents who testified, pretended ignorance of the persons who