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part of the criminal elements loyal to Coke. Clearly, the safety and
security of West Kingston was under direct threat of such magnitude
that it demanded a firm response by the security forces.
4.39.
We find that the several police stations which were
attacked, damaged or destroyed, were the objects of criminal intent to
create a virtual state of anarchy in West Kingston and to cause
maximum fear, panic and confusion. Moreover, these coordinated
attacks on police stations had the effect of causing the resources of the
JCF to be spread thin.
4.40.
We are of opinion that, having regard to the elaborate
fortification of Tivoli and the strategy and tactics deployed by Coke and
his cohorts, the offensive against the JCF was not a sudden and
spontaneous activity.
4.41
At Chapter 3.58 we commented favourably on the quality
of the Intelligence that alerted the security forces to the preparations
being made by criminals to fortify Tivoli Gardens. However, it seems to
us that,
in respect of the violent events of 23 May
, there were
deficiencies in the quality of the Intelligence available to the said
forces. Police Officers, who testified about those events, were clearly
surprised by and unprepared for the magnitude and coordination of the
onslaught directed at assets of the JCF. That Force was unable to pre-
empt the attacks on police stations or establish effective defence
mechanisms to protect the stations at Darling Street, Denham Town
and Hannah Town. The weaknesses in the security of those stations
leads us to conclude that the security forces did not receive timely and
reliable Intelligence of such a kind as would have enabled them to
mount counter measures to protect police assets in West Kingston