152 / 494
151
did explain, and we accept, that the development of a medical plan was
“largely the responsibility of the JDF”. We also accept ACP Blake’s
evidence that the JCF factored in the use of police vehicles and
ambulances to assist injured persons. Notwithstanding the plans, the
evidence of some of the civilian witnesses suggests that there is
validity in ACP Blake’s assessment that “overall the whole medical
system was not equipped to deal with the injured and the dead”.
When Mr. Witter and Bishop Blair toured Tivoli Gardens on 25 May with
Dr. Salmon, they saw a man who was badly injured but showing signs
of life. They brought this to Lt. Col. Sewell’s attention but, according to
the evidence of Mr. Witter, there was no response to their request for
urgent attention to the man. Finally, we received little or no evidence
from the security forces of the operations of ambulances on
24 and 25 May 2010.
7.52.
There was a gap between the services required and those
actually delivered. The gap can only be explained in terms of either
(a)
an inaccurate Intelligence estimate of the anticipated demand for
medical services or operational casualties; or
(b)
an operation that
went awry. The large number of injured and dead as well as property
damage may be indicative of such an operation; or
(c)
it may be that
insufficient regard was paid to the matter of civilian casualties despite
public appeals via the media;
(d)
there could even have been a
combination of
(a), (b)
and
(c)
above.
7.53.
Specific measures as referred to at paras.7.14 to 7.42,
were planned to minimise harm to persons. Thus, we recognise the
efforts of the JCF in appealing to the public through regular media
releases. And we deem it entirely appropriate that efforts were made
to encourage Coke to surrender peacefully and avoid the confrontation
that ultimately resulted. We commend Bishop Blair and Rev. Al Miller