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about 300 gunmen were in West Kingston bent on violence against the
agents of the State.
10.171.
It was therefore a counsel of prudence and basic
commonsense that retaliatory action on the part of the security forces
should take into consideration the nature and extent of “the threat
portfolio”. We ascribe no improper motive to the security forces in
planning a response that involved the use of “overwhelming numerical
force” to achieve the legitimate objective of putting down the violence
being perpetrated to deny Coke’s arrest.
10.172.
So far as the issue of the use of mortars is concerned, the
key questions as they appear to us, are whether they were an
appropriate response or whether their use, particularly in the heavily
built-up area of Tivoli Gardens, was proportionate to the threat offered
by Coke’s gunmen.
10.173.
We accept the evidence of Majs. Dixon and Cobb-Smith
that a mortar is a weapon of indirect fire and is not “pinpoint
accurate”. We are confident that CDS Saunders who took the decision
to use the mortar weapon also recognised these features of the mortar.
However, we have concerns about the propriety of the decision. In the
first place, we find it astonishing that CoP Ellington was not informed
of the intended use of mortars. As the joint Gold Commander of an
operation to be jointly executed by both branches of the security
forces, simple courtesy demanded that CoP Ellington should have been
made privy to the decision. Even though the use of mortars was not,
(and could not) be written into the JDF’s Operation Garden Parish, it
was a fact that Maj. Dixon’s team was training and preparing for the
possible use of mortars from late 2009. So, at Maj. Dixon’s level, it was
probably no secret.