310 / 494
309
having them pronounced dead by doctors is preferable to the
documentary evidence of the hospital itself. We reiterate that the oral
evidence of ACP Gause as to the practice of the hospital, the oral
evidence of SSP Graham that Sgt. Waugh did not reach the hospital
and the documentary evidence of KPH all weigh heavily in favour of a
finding that Sgt. Waugh did not go to KPH on 24 May. To the extent
that Sgt. Pratt impliedly supports Sgt. Waugh’s evidence, we find that
the evidence of those two officers was untrue.
10.107.
Turning next to the manner in which Sgt. Pratt carried out
instructions to collect dead bodies on 25 May, it was his evidence that
he was told by SSP Budhoo to “roam the community”. He says that he
was unfamiliar with Tivoli Gardens. It was his first visit to that
community. Yet, he did not seek to coordinate his task with
Sgt. Waugh. It seems to us that his approach to these duties was
loose, uncoordinated, haphazard and unprofessional. The collection of
dead bodies was an important and serious duty. Since Sgt. Pratt was
not familiar with the area, it was incumbent upon him to exercise care
and diligence in the execution of his tasks.
10.108.
We are perplexed by Sgt. Pratt’s response that he and the
members of his team came under sustained gunfire for 2 hours, that is
to say, covering “the moment of entry into Tivoli Gardens to the point
when 2 bodies were retrieved on 24 May 2010” (per his response). We
cannot find anywhere in a review of Sgt. Pratt’s evidence that he gave
such evidence. He clearly said that the team was “pinned down for
5 minutes” near the train line by the intersection of Industrial Terrace
and Marcus Garvey Drive. Later in his evidence-in-chief, he gave
evidence to the effect that when some of his team attempted to
retrieve 2 bodies, they were prevented from doing so by shooting. He