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joint elements earmarked for and deployed into the
operational zones.”
11.15.
In so far as coordination was required at the lower level of
command, measures were necessary to ensure accountability. Part of
CoP Ellington’s role was “to ensure that, as much as possible, there could be
accountability for the actions of the forces”.
Transition of Command
11.16.
The plan called for transition of leadership from the JDF to the JCF
after Tivoli Gardens was pacified. On 14 April 2015, CoP Ellington explained
that –
“A command transition is a very simple exercise. The
commanders simply agree that the threat level has subsided
significantly and we can now pass command back to you.
What we usually do – I don’t know if it was done because
given what was happening in the area, I don’t know if they
were able to complete what we call a decision log – but they
could simply get on the radio and report to Control that
command had been transitioned back to the JCF. Or
somebody would make a note of it and it could be logged
somewhere; or there could be transition of command and
nothing is said about it. But the officers who were there and
did it can come and explain what happened and when they
did it.”
11.17.
Difficulties associated with transition of command arose in the
afternoon of 24 May after the combat phase of the operation. At this time, the
JCF had entered the area of operation and, in those circumstances, they shared
operational space with the JDF. We make findings in respect of this matter later.
The JDF’s Chain of Command
11.18.
The JDF’s situational chain of command was similar to their usual
chain of command. At the apex was the Chief of Defence Staff and the
Headquarters Command Centre staffed by senior officers including the Deputy
Chief of Defence Staff. The Ground Commanders were the commanders of 1JR,