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“The Order was scripted as a guide to the officers, men and
women of both Forces who would take part in the operation.
It included some background information on the situation
that we were dealing with, threats and risk assessment, the
planning guidelines to be issued by the High Commands of
both forces, the intent of the operation, what it is that we
intended to achieve, the method that we were hoping to use
to execute the plan and issues such as administration,
record keeping, dealing with the injured, dealing with
casualties, if we had any, our communication and systems
and structures which would be put in place to ensure
accountability for the conduct of the operation.”
11.11.
While there was a measure of joint planning, the “need to know”
principle also applied to delimit the extent of information sharing. CoP Ellington
said -
“The Forces do not need to disclose their capabilities at all
times and there are certain questions that I do not ask about
JDF capabilities and there are certain questions that they do
not ask about JCF capabilities.”
11.12.
In that regard, as we have mentioned in Chapter 10, CoP Ellington
said that the use of mortars was not disclosed to him.
11.13.
The security forces did not have a unified command structure.
Thus, the JCF did not take orders from the JDF and vice versa. The Forces were
not governed by a single chain of command.
Division of Responsibility
11.14.
As Lt. Col. Ogilvie stated, the operation was divided into phases.
The reality on 24 May was, however, not straightforward if only because
members of the JCF were deployed with JDF troops. CoP Ellington said –
“There were joint deployments especially in the early phase
of the move-in. I would rather if the commanders who were
in charge of those units were here to describe exactly how
they were physically composed. But I know that there were