385 / 494
384
11.78.
And, more specifically on the issue of command responsibility for
the use of force by the JCF, CoP Ellington said –
“If you read the policy on the use of force, you see where it
says ‘The discharge of firearms is an individual’s
responsibility’.”
11.79.
Commanders, he continued, “are responsible for taking action if
people operate outside of the law”.
“if they are knowledgeable about misconduct and they fail to
exercise their supervisory duties, then they are culpable; but
they can’t be held responsible for the direct action of
individuals.”
11.80.
To the suggestion that he should have known what was happening
on the ground since he had been advised by the Prime Minister that residents
were reporting killings by the JCF, CoP Ellington replied:
“And we investigated. What else could be done?”
FINDINGS
11.81.
We accept that aberrant behaviour and abuses are not
necessarily evidence of poor supervision by the JCF. However, where
the prevalence of complaints of extra-judicial killings suggest a pattern
of abusive and illegal conduct that was unrestrained by supervision,
then the pattern may reasonably be considered as a failure of
management to adhere to systems and rules. We see it as a failure to
maintain internal discipline through the chain of command. When,
subsequently, there was no alacrity in systematically investigating
complaints of killings or to review incidents as is required by the JCF’s
own rules and procedures and international best practice, then, in our
view, there is an even greater failure of leadership. In our judgment,
CoP Ellington should have been held administratively accountable for
weak superintendence of the JCF in May 2010.