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381

transition could have been better implemented. To take one example:

there was no count of dead bodies at the time of transition of

leadership from the JDF to the JCF in the three sectors.

(ii)

The decision to use overwhelming numerical force.

This was predicated upon an assumption of large-scale, violent resistance from

gunmen. Such resistance did eventuate. We have reported elsewhere the time

taken by the Battalions to gain control and dominance of different sectors. It

was almost 5.00 p.m. before Maj. Henry controlled Foxy’s Plaza and PassaPassa

Plaza.

FINDING

11.68

Having regard to the Intelligence available to the security

forces of the number of gunmen available to Coke and the

evidence

of

the violence launched against the JCF and its assets on 23 May, we find

that the decision to use overwhelming numerical force was justified.

(iii)

The decision of the JDF commanders to remain in the area of operation

on a 24 hour basis for an extended period.

FINDING

11.69

In our opinion, the extended presence of senior

commanders of the JDF strengthened discipline and internal

accountability. It would also have afforded residents an opportunity to

have access to senior management of the JDF. Above all, it was a

decision which ensured that the Shower Posse did not quickly re-settle

within the community and maintain a power base therein.