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transition could have been better implemented. To take one example:
there was no count of dead bodies at the time of transition of
leadership from the JDF to the JCF in the three sectors.
(ii)
The decision to use overwhelming numerical force.
This was predicated upon an assumption of large-scale, violent resistance from
gunmen. Such resistance did eventuate. We have reported elsewhere the time
taken by the Battalions to gain control and dominance of different sectors. It
was almost 5.00 p.m. before Maj. Henry controlled Foxy’s Plaza and PassaPassa
Plaza.
FINDING
11.68
Having regard to the Intelligence available to the security
forces of the number of gunmen available to Coke and the
evidence
of
the violence launched against the JCF and its assets on 23 May, we find
that the decision to use overwhelming numerical force was justified.
(iii)
The decision of the JDF commanders to remain in the area of operation
on a 24 hour basis for an extended period.
FINDING
11.69
In our opinion, the extended presence of senior
commanders of the JDF strengthened discipline and internal
accountability. It would also have afforded residents an opportunity to
have access to senior management of the JDF. Above all, it was a
decision which ensured that the Shower Posse did not quickly re-settle
within the community and maintain a power base therein.