381 / 494
380
•
“de-confliction of boundaries”, viz. removing ambiguity as to
operational boundaries.
11.65.
In oral evidence on 20 October 2015, Lt. Col. Ogilvie amplified the
foregoing planning decisions and spoke directly to “the span of control”:
“Issues relating to the effective command and control of a
body of troops over a specific area is what we mean by ‘the
span of control’. But this really refers to making sure that
the troops that are deployed, are effectively commanded
and controlled with the relevant layers of supervision such
that they were not over-stretched and would not at any
point not be properly supervised. We also discussed very
specific roles for the various units, ensuring that there was
no confusion and overlapping of boundaries and areas of
responsibility. And, of course, we discussed identification of
persons, whether they were friendly, hostile or innocent by-
standers. That was a very central part of the planning.”
11.66.
We next discuss 7 specific decisions at (i) to (vii)
infra
:
(i)
The decision to have a clear division of responsibility between the JDF and
the JCF.
Differences in the capabilities of the two Forces informed this decision. It was
accepted throughout the course of the Enquiry that the level of threat posed by
Coke and his allies was beyond the capabilities of the JCF. The JDF was needed
to launch an assault against the barricaded environs of Tivoli Gardens in order to
gain entry and capture Coke. The JCF did not possess either the resources, the
training or expertise of the JDF to mount a successful challenge against Coke
and his allies in the conditions which prevailed on 23 and 24 May.
FINDING
11.67
We find that there was ample justification for this decision.
It was an arrangement that should have produced greater
accountability. But as noted above, the arrangements for command