386 / 494
385
11.82.
The decision to break with the pattern of previous
operations in Tivoli Gardens and, instead, establish a permanent
presence in that community was a very important and effective
decision. It was a crucial step in the process of “de-garrisonisation” of
that community. It was a stratagem aimed at preventing future armed
confrontation on the scale of that which occurred in May 2010.
11.83.
Whereas the CDS accepted command responsibility,
CoP Ellington so frequently deferred giving evidence on issues that he
appeared to us to be distancing himself from the tactical decision-
making processes on the ground. But, on his own admission, he was
remote from the activities of 24 May.
Adverse Comments re: CoP Owen Ellington
11.84.
On 13 April 2016, the Commission referred the drafts of
paras.11.59 (formerly 11.58), 11.81 and 11.83to CoP Owen Ellington as
“proposed adverse comments” and sought his responses thereto. We received
his responses by letter dated 15 April 2016 on 27 April 2016 and append the
letter as Appendix AC10 of this Report.
(A)
Re: Para.11.59 (formerly 11.58)- Summary of CoP Ellington’s Reponses
11.85.
(i)
It would have been reckless and dangerous for Scenes of
Crime officers to enter areas which were rigged with IEDs.
(ii)
It is contrary to the evidence for the Commission to
comment that there was little after-action written reporting
and assessments as a method of accountability and
institutional learning. The evidence shows that before and
during the internal security operation, systems of record
keeping were in place and were effectively used. This is
evident from “the Golding Papers”.