377 / 494
376
11.52.
In Chapter 10, we make findings specific to DSP Tabannah
and DSP Turner. But we have not been able to identify officers under
their command who may have misconducted themselves. There was
no evidence concerning the identity of JCF officers who were deployed
in the three sectors. Indeed, whereas CoP Ellington told us that the
Bronze Commanders would know the deployment of personnel and be
able to assist our Enquiry, the evidence revealed a contrary reality. For
example, even though Insp. Edwards gave evidence that he was in
command of an APC with about eleven other persons and identified
three of the police personnel, we were not able to identify the other
persons in the APC. This was a significant
lacuna
in the evidence since
allegations were made of unjustifiable killings by persons who may
have been in the APC.
PART B
COMMAND EFFECTIVENESS AND MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE
11.53.
The JDF readily acknowledged that there were complaints of
misconduct by certain soldiers during the operation. The internal disciplinary
mechanisms of the JDF were engaged and offenders were held to account. For
example, where a soldier of 1JR abandoned his post, he was charged, found
guilty and punished. His supervisor lost his rank.
11.54.
Lt. Col. Ogilvie testified that he got a report towards the end of
May that a female resident of Denham Town complained of untoward advances
to her at her residence late one night by a soldier. This soldier was charged,
found guilty and sentenced to 28 days confinement in the military prison. In
another case of physical abuse of a man, the offending soldier and his supervisor
were disciplined.