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374
implies a reckoning and answering for decisions and conduct based on
the rules and standards of the Police and the Defence Force and it may
include administrative accountability. In this context, administrative
accountability embraces the rules of occupational or professional
conduct that may be measured against those of peers in other
countries. But there are also standards of conduct that are imposed by
the law and policies such as a use of force policy. And there are times
when accountability rests on basic commonsense.
11.46.
Although we fully appreciate that the leadership of the JDF
necessarily had to be careful and astute in the handling of information
and were obliged to share information on a “need to know” basis, we
find that it was imprudent not to have informed CoP Ellington of the
potentiality of using mortars. Given the risks to the residents who
resided in a section of Tivoli Gardens earmarked for the detonation of
mortars, the decision to use such weapons may have benefitted from
the perspectives of the leader of the JCF.
11.47.
We find that the transition of command required
coordination of effort within the area of operation. Particularly during
the period of transition, the level of coordination between the JDF and
the JCF was inadequate. This inadequacy created spaces for abusive
conduct, possible criminality and reduced individual accountability.
The transition arrangements were clearly not detailed or sufficiently
formal. Therefore opportunities were created for elements within the
security forces to avoid individual accountability and command
responsibility.
11.48.
There were clear difficulties associated with the transition
of command in the afternoon of 24 May. There was no spatial division
of responsibility between the two Forces. As a consequence, there