379 / 494
378
11.59.
We find that, at the Bronze level itself, there was weak
leadership. Orders were given to record the locations of bodies.
Supt. Budhoo gave those instructions but he did not hold his
subordinates to account for the omission to make a record. In similar
vein, there is undisputed evidence from ACP Gause and CoP Ellington
himself, that the latter gave clear instructions on 25 May that
investigations into the deaths of persons should commence without
delay. Yet, the processing of crime scenes did not commence until
some ten days later. Once again, this is evidence of weak leadership
and a weak system of internal accountability. In addition, there was
little after-action written reporting and assessments as a method of
accountability and collective or institutional learning.
11.60.
Evidence was given that members of the security forces
wore masks during the operation. In the case of the JDF, the CDS
approved the wearing of masks by the CSB to protect their identities.
But there was also evidence of soldiers wearing handkerchiefs as
improvised masks, and some JCF personnel wearing masks. None of
these persons was authorised to wear masks. We accept the evidence
of Mr. Witter that, on 25 May, he saw members of the JCF wearing
masks. We find that some members of the security forces wore masks
to avoid identification or to avoid individual accountability for their
actions.
11.61.
Those who were supervising officers wearing masks ought
to have put a stop to the practice. We are driven to conclude that
there was either weak supervision or a supervisory permissiveness that
facilitated or ignored abusive conduct towards residents. This was
most evident in the JCF.