376 / 494
375
were difficulties in trying to determine which Force was accountable
for events or incidents that occurred during the period of transition.
For example, we were given different accounts of the times of entry of
JCF units and the conditions prevailing at those times, including the
level of gunfire and armed activity. The JDF and the JCF gave differing
times of entry into the area of operation within Tivoli Gardens.
11.49.
To further compound the difficulties, there was little
evidence of value placed before us as to who did what, when and
where. Thus, there was an absence of cogent evidence to determine
who, at the command level, was to be held responsible. These types of
issues were expressions of a problem of accountability or the
avoidance of responsibility that were made easier through a lack of
formality in the transition of command.
11.50.
Notwithstanding the difficulties, we were able to attribute
accountability to certain decisions as events occurred within a location.
Hence the decision to use mortars was that of CDS Saunders who
admitted that it was his decision. Similarly, to the extent that CoP
Ellington was not directly in command of the JCF units that were on the
ground in the area of operation, it is clear that the Bronze Commanders
must be accountable for the conduct of the officers under their control.
However, having regard to the evidence of Insp. Edwards that he was
in direct contact with CoP Ellington concerning the fact that Coke was
not located in Java, we find that, in that one instance, CoP Ellington
was a person at the Gold Command level to whom a junior officer
reported directly.
11.51.
We find that ACP Leslie Green was not involved in the
operation of 24 May.